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Alexander Brown 
 
Part 1 of this two-part article introduced the “Who?” question in the hate speech 
debate as well as this meta-question: on the basis of which moral and practical 
considerations should authorities specify the proper scope of incitement to hatred 
laws?1 Part 1 looked at consistency, practical and formal approaches. Here in Part 2 I 
shall focus instead on functional and democratic approaches. Along the way I shall 
also assess a range of substantive arguments about which particular characteristics 
should and should not be protected by incitement to hatred laws. My main conclusion 
shall be that each of the approaches has its strengths and weaknesses and that, partly 
because of this, no single approach is adequate by itself as a tool for specifying the 
proper scope of incitement to hatred laws, but also, by the same token, no approach 
should be ruled out entirely. Instead, the best strategy is one that combines together all 
five approaches in reasonable compromise given the law, the characteristic and the 
context. At the end of Part 2 I shall say more about the implications and relative 
importance of these different approaches and offer some observations about how they 
might be knitted together. I will end by discussing the potential applicability of my 
general approach to answering the “Who?” question to other types of hate speech law. 
 
I. Functional specification 
 
A fourth approach to specifying the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws looks to 
whatever scope best serves the underlying or real functions, purposes or objectives of 
incitement to hatred laws − functions that can serve to justify in a deep way the very 
existence of such laws. This is explicitly and directly a matter of connecting the 
“Who?” question (Who should be protected?) with the “Why?” question (Why hate 
speech laws?). The nature and content of the relevant underlying or real functions will 
be contested, of course. Nevertheless, I believe that functional arguments put in 
favour of incitement to hatred laws can be just as principled as arguments put against 
such laws.2 At any rate, underlying or real functions are to be distinguished from 
ostensible goals or apparent aims − which I have already discussed in relation to what 
I called practical specification in Part 1 − such as to deter acts of incitement to hatred 
or more simply to punish people who engage in incitement to hatred. Underlying or 
                                            
1 Alexander Brown, “The ‘Who?’ Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 1: Consistency, 
Practical, and Formal Approaches” (2016) 29:2 Can JL& Jur 275 [Brown, “Who”]. 
2 See, e.g., Catharine MacKinnon, Only Words (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993) 
at 83-84; Alexander Brown, Hate Speech Law: A Philosophical Examination (New York: 
Routledge, 2015) at 2 [Brown, “Hate Speech”]. Cf Ivan Hare, “Hate speech” in Peter Cane & 
Joanne Conaghan, eds, The New Oxford Companion to Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008) 520 at 521. 
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real functions speak to the fundamental reasons why a society should think it right or 
justifiable to deter acts of incitement to hatred or to punish people who engage in 
incitement to hatred in the first place. So what are the real functions of incitement to 
hatred laws? 
 
A. Symbolic function 
 
One possible function is expressive or symbolic in nature; to send out a message or to 
represent or signify something important. At face value, the message is simply that 
the government considers the conduct in question to be unacceptable. But there are 
also other, deeper messages or symbols that hate speech laws may carry, including, 
but not limited to, societal disapproval,3 solidarity,4 delegitimisation,5 and even 
remembrance.6 No less importantly, such laws may carry the message or symbolise 
the idea that people who are subject to hate speech are, in spite of what hate speakers 
say, “valued members of our polity”.7 But if incitement to hatred laws can fulfil 
valuable expressive or symbolic functions, then perhaps these functions must also 
dictate to some extent the proper scope of such laws. After all, if the idea that racial 
minorities, for example, are valued members of the polity is a worthwhile message or 
symbol to send or carry, worthwhile enough to strengthen the case for laws banning 
incitement to racial hatred, then surely this could also be a worthwhile message to 
send out in respect of other groups in the polity, such as groups identified by disability 
or gender identity, say.8 It is important (so the argument would run) for authorities to 
use the powerfully expressive or symbolic medium of the criminal law to say to these 
groups, ‘You too are valued members of our polity.’ Of course, none of this precludes 
                                            
3  See, e.g., David F Partlett, “From Red Lion Square to Skokie to the Fatal Shore: Racial 
Defamation and Freedom of Speech” (1989) 22:3 Vand J Transnat’l L 431 at 469; Bhikhu 
Parekh, “The Rushdie Affair: Research Agenda for Political Philosophy” (1990) 38:4 Pol 
Stud 695 at 705. 
4 David Kretzmer, “Freedom of Speech and Racism” (1987) 8:3 Cardozo L Rev 445 at 456 
[Kretzmer]. 
5 Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, Toleration as Recognition (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002) at 156. 
6 Julie C. Suk, “Denying Experience: Holocaust Denial and the Free-Speech Theory of the 
State” in Michael Herz & Peter Molnar, eds, The Content and Context of Hate Speech: 
Rethinking Regulation and Responses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 144 at 
154. 
7 Mari J Matsuda, “Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story” 
(1989) 87:8 Mich L Rev 2320 at 2322 [Matsuda]. 
8 See, e.g., Jonathan Cohen, “More Censorship or Less Discrimination? Sexual Orientation 
Hate Propaganda in Multiple Perspectives” (2000) 46:1 McGill LJ 69 at 81 [Cohen, “More 
Censorship”]; Kay Goodall, “Challenging Hate Speech: Incitement to Hatred on Grounds of 
Sexual Orientation in England, Wales and Northern Ireland” (2009) 13:2-3 Intl JHR 211 at 
223 [Goodall]. 
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governmental authorities from also using other sorts of expressive or symbolic acts to 
get this message across, including ministerial speeches and pronouncements. 
 Arguably an official message of equal standing takes on an even greater 
significance for a particular group when other similar groups do already benefit from 
legal protections against hate speech. For, in these circumstances the absence of legal 
protection could send the message to those who are not protected “that they are 
second class citizens not entitled to equal protection of the law”.9 In the 1990s, for 
example, some scholars made the case for a new stirring up religious hatred offence in 
the UK, the function of which would be partly to send a message to Muslims that they 
were indeed members of society in equal standing.10 Later, much the same point was 
made about the symbolism of a government which declines to provide gays and 
lesbians with the same legal protections against incitement to hatred afforded to other 
groups in society.11 More recently, this argument has been applied to disability and 
transgender identity.12 In the words of Neil Chakraborti,  
 
laws exist and they send out a powerful symbolic message to those particular 
communities [who are subject to incitement to hatred on grounds of racial, 
religious or sexual orientation]. I do not see why the same could not apply when 
it comes to transphobic hate speech.13 
 
Putting this point slightly differently, a failure to legislate against the stirring up of 
hatred in accordance with the principle of parity (treating like groups alike) might 
itself send out a message of unequal standing or lesser sociolegal status for certain 
groups in society, depending on other aspects of the context, of course. 
 Now some people might counter at this stage that functional arguments of the 
present sort can cut both ways depending on which message is actually being sent out; 
after all, laws can send out unintended as well as intended messages about equal 
standing.14 So, for example, in a society where a great many groups do not receive 
protection from hate speech via incitement to hatred laws, what message is sent out to 
those few groups who do receive such protection? On one reading, it might say that 
they particularly valued members of the polity. But there is an alternative message. 
                                            
9 Cohen, “More Censorship”, supra note 8 at 75. 
10 See, e.g., Tariq Modood, “Muslims, Incitement to Hatred and the Law” in John Horton, ed, 
Liberalism, Multiculturalism and Toleration (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993) 139 at 147 
[Modood]. 
11 See, e.g., Marie-France Major, “Sexual-Orientation Hate Propaganda: Time to Regroup” 
(1996) 11:1 CJLS 221 at 231 [Major]. 
12 Cf Law Commission, Hate Crime: Should The Current Offences Be Extended? (Paper No 
348) (London: The Stationery Office, 2014) at para 7.12 [Law Commission]. 
13 UK, HC, Women and Equalities Committee, “Oral evidence: Transgender Equality Inquiry, 
HC, 390” (London: The Stationary Office Limited, 2015) at Q46, online: 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-
and-equalities-committee/transgender-equality/oral/21345.pdf. 
14 Cf Law Commission, supra note 12 at paras 7.73-7.89. 
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Might it say to them that they are too stupid, feckless or cowardly to defend 
themselves against hate speech? This message is far from edifying and could 
undermine rather than support the case for having any incitement to hatred laws in 
that society. 
 But, then again, maybe it all depends on the group and the context. Surely there is 
no stigma attached to benefiting from incitement to hatred laws if the relevant laws 
actually better enable members of the relevant groups to engage in their own counter-
speech because they can be confident that the law is there to back up or validate what 
they are saying to hate speakers. Of course, when running this sort of argument it is 
very important not to make simplistic generalisations about the relative abilities to 
counter-speak of different groups. To give an example of over-simplification, 
consider Ian Cram’s generalisation that the situation of being less able to counter-
speak “may be true for disabled people but not for able-bodied black people, members 
of religious minorities, gays, lesbians and others.”15 This is misleading for two 
reasons. On the one hand, arguably Cram goes too far in suggesting a lesser ability to 
counter-speak on the part of all people with disabilities. By drawing a distinction 
between ‘disabled people’ and ‘able-bodied black people’ Cram seems to conflate 
being disabled with physical disability. Yet this ignores a potentially salient difference 
between people with learning disabilities, for whom their disabilities could indeed 
make it more difficult to engage in counter-speech, and people with physical 
disabilities, for whom their disabilities might be no greater an impediment to speaking 
back than being a member of a racial or other minority group. Consider the music of 
Ian Dury and the Blockheads. On the other hand, Cram does not go far enough in 
acknowledging the various psychological and emotional burdens as well as social and 
material impediments that, for many groups in society, make it difficult for them to 
engage in effective counter-speech, including not merely people with disabilities but 
also members of racial, religious, sexual orientation, and gender identity minority 
groups.16  
At any rate, I do not deny that authorities may fail sometimes to accurately 
predict what message people will take from a law or what will matter to people about 
a law symbolically. But it does not follow from this lack of certainty that the 
expressive function of law should be dismissed entirely when determining the proper 
scope of incitement to hatred laws. Suppose for the sake of argument that what 
incitement to hatred laws are saying or symbolising to people is the following: ‘We 
the government recognise how challenging it can be for any groups against whom 
hatred is being stirred up to actively engage in counter-speech, so we want to help 
support this counter-speech by banning incitement to hatred, because we believe that 
the very existence of such laws will give people the authority as well as the courage 
they need to speak back.’ If this is the real message behind incitement to hatred laws 
                                            
15  Ian Cram, “Hate Speech and Disabled People: Some Comparative Constitutional 
Thoughts” in Anna Lawson & Caroline Gooding, eds, Disability Rights in Europe: From 
Theory to Practice (Oxford: Hart, 2005) 65 at 71, n 24. 
16 Cf Brown, “Hate Speech”, supra note 2 at 257-62. 
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in the UK, then surely it would be much more difficult to justify (on these grounds) a 
failure to extend the scope of these laws so that they cover not only race, religion, and 
sexual orientation but also disability and gender identity, for example. 
 
B. Social evils 
 
According to James Weinstein, the expressive or symbolic function of law cannot be 
the only or main warrant for hate speech laws; only a subsidiary warrant at best.17 I 
have discussed this assumption elsewhere and shall not rehearse the arguments here.18 
Instead, I simply point out that the functional approach to scope specification is 
certainly not exhausted by symbolic or expressive functional arguments. Another 
highly significant – perhaps even core – function or purpose of hate speech laws is to 
combat harm. When hate speech takes the form of insults, slurs, derogatory epithets or 
other abusive comments targeted directly at individuals, especially in face-to-face 
encounters but also increasingly now via the Internet, the most pressing harms tend to 
be to the victim’s psychological and physiological health.19 But when hate speech 
takes the form of the stirring up of hatred, the most germane harms are social evils, 
that is, evils that characteristically operate at the societal level. On the present way of 
looking at things, therefore, the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws must reflect, 
whatever else it reflects, facts about which groups are subject to forms of stirring up 
hatred that either constitute or contribute to social evils. Of course, there is likely to 
be some overlap here with practical arguments as well: this is because some 
functional arguments will assume that incitement to hatred laws are able to combat 
social evils through the ostensible goal of deterring the relevant forms of hate speech. 
 What are these social evils? Unsurprisingly, they are many and heterogeneous. 
One argument appeals to the connection between stirring up hatred and the social 
evils of discrimination or violence. Defending the government’s introduction of a new 
offence of stirring up hatred on grounds of sexual orientation in 2007, for example, 
the then Minister of State for Justice, David Hanson MP, made it clear that the real 
function or purpose of the offence was not merely expressive but also the deterrence 
of social evils. “The Government considers that legislation which prohibits the stirring 
up of hatred will deter such behaviour and send a message that it is unacceptable, 
leading to homophobic hatred becoming less widespread and in turn reducing the 
number of incidents of violence, bullying and discrimination.”20 In my view the 
Minister oversimplified the nature of argument when he declared that “[t]he 
Government is persuaded that there is a link between the availability of material liable 
                                            
17 See, e.g., James Weinstein, “A Constitutional Roadmap to the Regulation of Campus Hate 
Speech” (1992) 38:1 Wayne L Rev 163 at 223, 245. 
18 See Brown, “Hate Speech”, supra note 2 at 241, 248-50. 
19 Ibid at 49-66. 
20 David Hanson, Letter to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, 25 November 2007, at para 
6, online: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200708/jtselect/jtrights/37/3710.htm 
[Hanson]. 
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to incite homophobic hatred and levels of homophobic violence.”21 It is important not 
to collapse two steps in the argument: the first is that a high enough incidence of 
people stirring up hatred against groups can contribute to the creation and 
maintenance of a climate of hatred toward those groups; the second is that this climate 
of hatred is characterised in part by a heightened risk of acts of discrimination or 
violence.22 Be that as it may, what implications does the present argument have for 
the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws? I take it as read that legislators can be 
warranted up to a point in banning incitement to hatred against a given group if there 
is minimally adequate evidence of the aforementioned links between hate speech and 
social evils. This seems to be how scholars have viewed the social evils argument for 
incitement to hatred laws on grounds of race, ethnicity, nationality or religion,23 
sexual orientation,24 and disability.25 I can see no a priori reason to rule out the 
possibility of similar arguments to the effect that new stirring up hatred offences can 
be warranted up to a point if there is evidence to suggest that people stirring up hatred 
on grounds of disability or gender identity, say, can contribute to a climate of hatred 
in which acts of discrimination or violence against the relevant groups are more 
likely. 
 A related function of incitement to hatred laws could be to reduce feelings of 
insecurity suffered by groups who are subject to such speech. The relevant working 
hypothesis is that incitement to hatred can contribute not merely to a climate of hatred 
but also to a climate of fear.26 In the words of Caroline Flint MP, speaking of the need 
                                            
21 Ibid at para 8. 
22 See, e.g., Brown, “Hate Speech”, supra note 2 at 66-71. 
23 See, e.g., Laurence Hauptman, “Group Defamation and the Genocide of American Indians” 
in Monroe H Freedman and Eric M Freedman, eds, Group Defamation and Freedom of 
Speech: The Relationship Between Language and Violence (Westport: Greenwood Press, 
1995) 9 at 11; Alexander Tsesis, Destructive Messages: How Hate Speech Paves the Way for 
Harmful Social Movements (New York: New York University Press, 2002) at 138; L W 
Sumner, The Hateful and the Obscene: Studies in the Limits of Free Expression (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2004) at 162-63 [Sumner]; Bhikhu Parekh, “Hate Speech: Is 
There a Case for Banning?” (2005-6) 12:4 Pub Pol’y Research 213 at 217-18; Glyn Morgan, 
“Mill’s Liberalism, Security, and Group Defamation” in Glen Newey, ed, Freedom of 
Expression: Counting the Costs (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2007) 121 at 136-37 
[Morgan]; Alexander Brown, “The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006: A Millian 
Response” (2008) 11:1 Crit Rev Intl Soc & Poltl Phil 1 at 13 [Brown, “Racial”]. 
24 See, e.g., Major, supra note 11 at 227; Cohen, “More Censorship”, supra note 8 at 74-75; 
Martin Bowley, “A Cancer at the Heart of Society” (2000) 150 New LJ 1203 at 1203; 
Morgan, supra note 23 at 136-37; Goodall, supra note 8 at 218; Katharine Gelber & Luke 
McNamara, “The Effects of Civil Hate Speech Laws: Lessons from Australia” (2015) 49:3 
Law & Soc’y Rev 631 at 635. 
25 Mairian Corker, “The UK Disability Discrimination Act: Disabling Language, Justifying 
Inequitable Social Participation” in Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers, eds, Americans 
with Disabilities: Exploring Implications of the Law for Individuals and Institutions (New 
York: Routledge, 2000) 357 at 365 [Corker]. 
26 Brown, “Hate Speech”, supra note 2 at 71-75. 
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for a new stirring up religious hatred offence in 2005, “[i]t is widely accepted that 
individuals in our society are stirring up hatred against particular religious groups” 
and “[a]t an individual level this can lead to fear and intimidation”.27 As regards to 
scope, it is often said that members of groups defined by race or religion can be made 
to feel insecure as a result of the stirring up of hatred against them because of 
historical patterns in which the stirring up of hatred has been accompanied or 
proceeded by acts of violence and discrimination.28 It does not require a Herculean 
leap of imagination to see how other groups in society that have also historically 
suffered violence and discrimination could also be made to feel insecure by the 
stirring up of hatred against them − for example, gays and lesbians,29 people with 
disabilities,30 people with transgender identities,31 and women.32 
 Going beyond the narrow issue of insecurity qua fear of discrimination and 
violence, Jeremey Waldron argues that another important yet overlooked function of 
hate speech laws (he focuses on group defamation laws) is to curb hate speech which 
tends to be destructive of a public assurance of civic dignity, resulting in targeted 
groups feeling insecure as to their equal sociolegal status in society.33 Here it is 
relevant to ask not merely ‘Which forms of hate speech are particularly destructive of 
public assurances?’ but also ‘Which groups are most in need of hate speech laws 
because of the vulnerability or precariousness of their sense of equal standing in 
society?’.34 Focusing on the latter question, the answer depends in part on the wider 
context. One could certainly imagine groups of people whose access to rights and 
liberties is so well established that the mere presence of group defamation, for 
                                            
27 Caroline Flint, Letter to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, 3 February 2005, at para 
69, online: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200405/jtselect/jtrights/60/6013.htm. 
28 See, e.g., Modood, supra note 10 at 146; Raymond Chow, “Inciting Hatred or Merely 
Engaging in Religious Debate? The Need for Religious Vilification Laws” (2005) 30:3 Alt LJ 
120 at 120 [Chow]; Brown, “Hate Speech”, supra note 2 at 71-75. It also seems necessary 
here that people have good reason to feel insecure, such as if the correlation is non-accidental 
(ibid at 73-74). 
29 See, e.g., Linda Garnets et al, “Violence and Victimization of Lesbians and Gay Men: 
Mental Health Consequences” in Gregory M. Herek & Kevin T Berrill, eds, Hate Crimes: 
Confronting Violence Against Lesbians and Gay Men (London: Sage, 1992) 207 at 215-16; 
Gerald P Mallon, “Sticks and Stones Can Break Your Bones: Verbal Harassment and 
Physical Violence in the Lives of Gay and Lesbian Youths in Child Welfare Settings” (2001) 
13:1-2 J Gay & Lesbian Soc Serv 63 at 71-72; Ellen Faulkner, “Homophobic Hate 
Propaganda in Canada” (2006) 5:1 J Hate Stud 63 at 81-82 [Faulkner]. 
30 See, e.g., John Stanton-Ife, Criminalising Conduct with Special Reference to Potential 
Offences of Stirring Up Hatred Against Disabled or Transgender Persons (London: Law 
Commission, 2013) at para 57 [Stanton-Ife]. 
31 Ibid. 
32 See, e.g., Kylie Weston-Scheuber, “Gender and the Prohibition of Hate Speech” (2012) 
12:2 QUT L & Just J 132 at 141-43 [Weston-Scheuber]. 
33 Jeremy Waldron, “Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate” (2010) 123:7 Harv Rev 
1596 at 1623, 1630 [Waldron]. 
34 Brown, “Hate Speech”, supra note 2 at 148-56. 
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instance, would do little to reduce their sense of security in their equal sociolegal 
status.35 By contrast, there may be groups who suffer unequal access to rights and 
liberties and whose sense of status is more vulnerable to hate speech as a result. 
Consider the position of gay and lesbian people in Russia who not merely face a lack 
of protection against incitement to hatred on grounds of sexual orientation, despite the 
fact that other groups in the country defined by religion, nationality, and race do 
benefit from such protections,36 but also must endure the existence of laws prohibiting 
“the promotion of non-traditional sexual relationships” (gay propaganda law).37 
Moving on from LGBT issues, what of the position of people with disabilities? This, 
once again, will depend on the sociolegal position in which they find themselves in a 
given country, as well as on which types of disabilities are in play. But generalising 
across contexts and types, it does not seem unreasonable to suppose that if the 
position of people with disabilities is already precarious − if they already face 
significant discrimination in the workplace and discrimination in the provision of 
public services, such as housing, access to public spaces, and so on, and if anti-
discrimination laws, such as they exist, lack teeth or are not properly enforced − then 
it is quite possible that, as Stanton-Ife puts it, “[e]ven a small or incipient 
phenomenon of persons intending to stir up hatred against these groups would suffice 
for the applicability of Waldron’s argument.”38 
An additional function of incitement to hatred laws might be to maintain public 
order in the traditional sense of keeping the peace. In England and Wales this function 
is indicated by the fact that the stirring up hatred offences have been classified as 
public order offences via the Public Order Act 1986.39 If maintaining public order is 
                                            
35 Ibid at 150-152. 
36 The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, 1996/63, art 282.1. 
37 Russian Federation, 24 December 2010, Federal Law No. 436-FZ of 2010 on Protection of 
Children from Information Harmful to their Health and Development, as amended by Federal 
Law No.135-FZ of 2013, on Amendments to Article 5 of the Federal Law “On the Protection 
of Children from Information Harmful to their Health and Development” and Miscellaneous 
Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation for the Purpose of Protecting Children from 
Information that Promotes the Rejection of Traditional Family Values. 
38 Stanton-Ife, supra note 30 at para 63. Once again, it seems necessary here that people have 
good reason to feel insecure in their sociolegal status (ibid at paras 70-71). 
39 (UK), c 64, parts 3, 3A [Public Order Act 1986]. Note, the stirring up hatred offences can 
be traced back to the criminal offence of seditious libel in English common law. But it is 
important to recognise that the criminal offence of seditious libel evolved into two distinct 
clusters of laws. First, laws that ban the stirring up of hatred. See, e.g., Brown, “Hate 
Speech”, supra note 2 at 26-28. Second, laws that prohibit public speech or other expressive 
conduct concerning or directed at members of groups or classes of persons identified by 
protected characteristics that constitutes a threat to public order, in the sense that it causes or 
is likely to cause a public mischief, breach of the peace, or danger to public safety. See, e.g., 
ibid at 28-29. Pace Lord Justice Lawton in R. v Edwards (1983) 5 Cr App R (S) 145 at 148, I 
would argue that both clusters have an equally strong claim to being the modern day 
equivalent of the criminal offence of seditious libel. 
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one of the underlying or real functions of incitement to hatred laws, then it might be 
tempting to try to draw distinctions between different protected characteristics.40 It 
has been suggested by some people, for example, that stirring up hatred on grounds of 
sexual orientation, disability or gender identity is not as significant a threat to public 
order as stirring up racial or religious hatred.41 As a brute statistical fact about the 
percentage of public disturbances that historically have had something to do with 
racial or religious identity as compared to other markers of identity this might turn out 
to be true. But, then again, this argument could also point in unexpected directions. In 
some countries and at certain times, the logic of safeguarding public order might 
warrant incitement to hatred laws that covered social class or even profession as 
protected characteristics. Such laws were once part of the Italian Criminal Code,42 and 
it is not beyond the realms of possibility that a future Italian government could 
reintroduce them, perhaps in response to events like the international ‘day of rage’ in 
2011 during which peaceful protesting against bankers and politicians descended into 
pitch battles between protestors and police, rioting, vandalism, and arson. 
Then again, perhaps what matters here is not statistics on public disturbances but 
deeper sociological explanations about why hate speech against certain characteristics 
might be especially dangerous. Maybe the thought is that race and religion are special 
because they are closely related to interpersonal attraction, family-making and group 
formation − all of which can be focal points for powerful psychological drives to stick 
together and protect one’s own, including, if necessary, through the use of violence. 
Yet surely for many people their sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability is 
also closely related to interpersonal attraction, family-making and group formation. At 
any rate, it would be naive, I think, to simply assume that the threat-levels associated 
with incitement to hatred on grounds of sexual orientation, disability or gender 
identity could never be high enough to justify the creation of new stirring up hatred 
offences. Consider a small group of people distributing leaflets or holding up banners 
or placards inciting hatred against transgender people directly outside a building in 
which a transgender beauty pageant is taking place. Could we confidently say that 
their actions could never pose a threat to public order? Here the threat of violence 
                                            
40 Distinctions might also be drawn between different kinds of speech. For example, it could 
conceivably be argued that criticism or insult of religious prophets or religious beliefs (where 
this does not amount to stirring up religious hatred) poses an even greater threat to public 
order than stirring up religious hatred because religionists may feel that they have a religious 
duty to react strongly to such criticisms or insults. Cf British Humanist Association, Final 
(Third) Submission to the Select Committee on Religious Offences: Legislation on Incitement 
of Religious Hatred, 4 December 2002, at para 6, online: https://humanism.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/BHA-Submission-on-Religious-Offences-3.pdf. 
41 See, e.g., Simon Bronitt & James Stellios, “Sedition, Security and Human Rights: 
‘Unbalanced’ Law Reform in the ‘War on Terror’” (2006) 30:3 Melbourne UL Rev 923 at 
947. 
42 David Riesman, “Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel” (1942) 42:5 Colum 
L Rev 727 at 744-45. 
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might derive not from people who agree with the transphobic hate speech 
(sympathisers) but from those who object to it (hecklers). 
Of course, those who defend incitement to hatred laws must also confront the 
heckler’s veto objection: namely, that facts about how an audience is likely to respond 
to speech, such as by disturbing the peace, should not be used as a basis for restricting 
speech since it would in effect give audiences the power to censor speech by threat of 
disturbing the peace.43 I do not intend to try to rebut that argument here. Instead, I 
simply want to make the point that if threats to public order from predictable audience 
reactions are a sound basis for, or can warrant, incitement to hatred laws, despite the 
heckler’s veto objection, then this basis should hold for any characteristics concerning 
which such audience reactions can be predicted. It would be an inconsistent argument 
that said a threat of public disturbance relating to the stirring up of racial or religious 
hatred can be a basis for prohibition but a similar threat of similar public disturbance 
relating to the stirring up of hatred on grounds of sexual orientation, disability or 
gender identity cannot. 
 Yet another, admittedly very broad, family of social evils that a society might 
choose to combat through hate speech laws can be described in terms of the 
inegalitarian effects of such speech. In some contexts, hate speech can (i) reinforce 
societal and institutional prejudices, (ii) deprive groups of important rights and 
powers, such as by inhibiting normal functioning within, or even forcing a complete 
withdrawal from, educational settings, the workplace, leisure and exercise facilities, 
civil society, and the political sphere or public forums broadly construed, (iii) enact or 
perpetuate forms of subordination, oppression, and political powerlessness, or (iv) 
support and maintain a background of social norms that in turn can make it more 
difficult for groups to engage in effective counter-speech. Writers have linked such 
effects not merely with hate speech concerning race, ethnicity, nationality, and 
religion44 but also with hate speech concerning sex or gender identity, including 
female identity45 and transgender identity,46 sexual orientation, mainly being gay or 
                                            
43 See Harry Kalven Jr, The Negro and the First Amendment (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1965); David A J Richards, Toleration and the Constitution (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1986); David A J Richards, Free Speech and the Politics of Identity 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) [Richards, “Free Speech”]. 
44 See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989) at 148 [Greenawalt, “Speech”]; Kent Greenawalt, Fighting Words: 
Individuals, Communities and Liberties of Speech (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1995) at 59-60 [Greenawalt, “Fighting Words”]; Chow, supra note 28 at 120-21; Brown, 
“Hate Speech”, supra note 2 at 80-86, 194-201, 257-62. 
45 See, e.g., Greenawalt, “Speech”, supra note 44 at 299; Greenawalt, “Fighting Words”, 
supra note 44 at 59-60; Donna L. Lillian “A Thorn By Any Other Name: Sexist Discourse as 
Hate Speech” (2007) 18:6 Discourse Soc 719 at 736. 
46 See, e.g., Martha T. Zingo, Sex/Gender Outsiders, Hate Speech and Freedom of 
Expression: Can They Say That About Me? (Westport: Praeger, 1998) at 165-67 [Zingo]. 
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lesbian,47 disability,48 and physical appearance, most notably obesity.49 Of course, not 
all the writers who recognise these inegalitarian effects believe that the right response 
to them, all things considered, is to enact criminal incitement to hatred laws. Clearly 
some do not.50 But for those writers who do think that there is at least a pro tanto case 
to be made for such laws, they have had no conceptual or empirical difficulty in 
extending their arguments to a broad range of characteristics.  
 However, at this point it might be suggested that hate speech is likely to produce 
differential effects, in terms of causing or not causing forms of social inequality and 
oppression, depending on which protected characteristics are at stake. Take (iv) which 
has to do with how hate speech can help to support and maintain social norms that can 
block counter-speech, such as a norm that says victims of hate speech ought to turn 
the other cheek. Interestingly, however, in her study of the motives of hate speakers 
and of the response strategies adopted by people who are the subjects of hate speech 
in the US, Laura Leets set out to test, amongst other things, the hypothesis that “Jews 
will report more assertive response strategies than homosexuals” potentially because 
“Jews have a more secure place in society than homosexuals” and because “increased 
assertiveness on [the part of homosexuals] may have a more perilous effect (e.g., 
antigay violence) than for their Jewish counterparts”.51 If proven to be true, this 
hypothesis might have suggested that for Jews, unlike gays, hate speech laws 
(potentially including incitement to hatred laws) would not be warranted since Jews, 
unlike gays, could adopt an alternative remedy of assertively talking back to hate 
speakers. However, Leets discovered that this hypothesis was not support by the 
results of her research. In fact, the data “indicated no significant difference across the 
two groups [in the extent of assertive response strategies]”.52 
                                            
47 See, e.g., Greenawalt, “Speech”, supra note 44 at 299; Greenawalt, “Fighting Words”, 
supra note 44 at 59-60; Zingo, supra note 46 at 165; Cohen, “More Censorship”, supra note 8 
at 94; Faulkner, supra note 29 at 81-82; Eric Heinze, “Cumulative Jurisprudence and Hate 
Speech: Sexual Orientation and Analogies to Disability, Age, and Obesity” in Ivan Hare & 
James Weinstein, eds, Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009) 265 at 279 [Heinze, “Cumulative Jurisprudence”]. 
48 See, e.g., Corker, supra note 25 at 366; Heinze, “Cumulative Jurisprudence”, supra note 47 
at 276; Timothy Shriver, “The Bigotry Behind the Word ‘Retard’”, The Washington Post (15 
February 2010), online: www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/02/14/AR2010021402893.html; Andreas Dimopoulos, “Balancing 
Disability Protection Against Freedom of Speech: Should an Offence of Incitement to 
Disability Hatred be Introduced?” (2015) Pub L 79 at 92-93. 
49 See, e.g., UK, All Party Parliamentary Group on Body Image, Reflections on Body Image 
(London: HMSO, 2012) at 61, online: 
www.ncb.org.uk/media/861233/appg_body_image_final.pdf. 
50 Zingo, supra note 46; Heinze, “Cumulative Jurisprudence”, supra note 47; Eric Heinze, 
Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
51 Laura Leets, “Experiencing Hate Speech: Perceptions and Responses to Anti-Semitism and 
Antigay Speech” (2002) 58:2 J Soc Issues 341 at 345-346 [Leets]. 
52 Ibid at 353. 
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C. Interests-balancing 
 
Another functional strategy might be to specify the scope of incitement to hatred laws 
in whichever way achieves the optimum balance of interests, including interests in 
freedom of expression, where optimality might be defined in terms of whichever 
scope maximises the net satisfaction of interests.53 How would this approach play out 
in practice? What distinctions would it suggest, if any, between incitement to hatred 
laws that protect different characteristics? One possibility is that authorities should 
distinguish between incitement to religious hatred laws and incitement to racial 
hatred laws to reflect differential risk factors that these laws will be overbroad (ban 
valuable speech) or have a chilling effect (deter valuable speech).54 In other words, if 
laws banning incitement to religious hatred pose a much greater threat to interests in 
freedom of expression than do laws banning incitement to racial hatred, then, under 
an interests-balancing approach to the “Who?” question, this might well tip the scales 
against the former but in favour of the latter. 
 In fact, precisely this argument came to prominence in England and Wales around 
the time of the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill.55 Several commentators argued that 
those people tasked with enforcing the proposed new legislation banning the stirring 
up of religious hatred would have an especially hard time distinguishing between 
speech that stirs up hatred against religious believers and speech that merely stirs up 
hatred against religious beliefs (such as through criticism, ridicule and satire).56 The 
legislation will unavoidably (so the objection went) either ban or chill the latter along 
with the former, and thereby ride rough shod over weighty speaker and audience 
interests in freedom of expression on religious affairs. Of course, originally the Racial 
                                            
53 Cf Sumner, supra note 23 at 60-63; Evan Simpson, “Responsibilities for Hateful Speech” 
(2006) 12:2  Leg Theory 157 at 158; Jonathan Gilmore, “Expression as Realization: 
Speakers’ Interests in Freedom of Speech” (2011) 30:5 Law & Phil 517 at 539; Frederick 
Schauer, “Social Epistemology, Holocaust Denial, and the Post-Millian Calculus” in Michael 
Herz & Peter Molnar, eds, The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation 
and Responses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 129 at 138; Brown, “Hate 
Speech”, supra note 2 at 222-34. 
54 See, e.g., Susannah C. Vance, “The Permissibility of Incitement to Religious Hatred 
Offenses Under European Convention Principles” (2004) 14:1 Transnat’l L & Contemp Probs 
201 at 205 [Vance]; Ivan Hare, “Crosses, Crescents and Sacred Cows: Criminalising 
Incitement to Religious Hatred” (2006) Pub L 521 at 537-538 [Hare, “Crosses”]. 
55 Bill 31, 2005-2006 sess, 2005 [Racial and Religious Hatred Bill]. 
56 See, e.g., Rowan Atkinson, “The Opposition’s Case” in Lisa Appignanesi, ed, Free 
Expression is No Offence (London: Penguin, 2005) 59 at 60; Gareth Crossman, “Religious 
Hate: A Criminal Offence? Liberty Says No” (2005) Leg Action 9 at 9; Philip Pullman, 
“Against ‘Identity’” in Lisa Appignanesi, ed, Free Expression is No Offence (London: 
Penguin Books, 2005) 105 at 110. Cf  Eric Barendt, “Religious Hatred Laws: Protecting 
Groups or Belief?” (2011) 17:1 Res Publica 41. 
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and Religious Hatred Bill57 did not contain the absurd rule of thumb that any attempt 
to stir up hatred against a religion shall be taken as prima facie evidence of an intent 
to stir up hatred against religious believers. Even so, the worry seemed to be that the 
police, public prosecutors, magistrates, judges and juries could end up unwittingly 
following this rule of thumb. And so the worry was as much about legal practioners as 
about the law: about their ability to make sensible decisions, based on the facts of the 
case, as to whether a suspect or defendant had stirred up hatred against religious 
believers as opposed to against religious beliefs.  
 However, it should not be forgotten that legal professionals already had to 
distinguish between speech that stirs up hatred against people due to their race or 
ethnicity and speech that merely stirs up hatred against aspects of racial or ethnic 
identity and culture itself. To see this point consider the following example. Suppose 
for the sake of argument that legal professionals would have a hard time (although I 
can find scant evidence to suggest that they would) distinguishing between ‘You think 
you can live with Muslims, think again, they are vile, backward, and sadistic people 
who deserve only our hatred, and when this country is finally united in its hatred of 
them they had better watch out!’ and ‘Unlike Christianity, Islam doesn’t teach that 
Jesus died on the cross for the sins of humankind and doesn’t teach that our eternal 
salvation lies in having faith in Jesus Christ; instead Islam teaches that salvation is 
earned through faithful obedience to the teachings of Allah, as revealed through the 
Prophet Muhammad, and in my opinion this makes Islamic beliefs more dangerous 
than Christian beliefs.’ Would legal professionals have any easier or harder time 
distinguishing between ‘I hate these golliwogs who come over here and take our jobs 
and if you cared about this country you would hate them as well, so trust me when I 
say that if we all start listening to our true feelings about these people they had all 
better be careful!’ and ‘White British ethnicity includes a cultural heritage of cricket 
and cucumber sandwiches, whereas Afro-Caribbean British ethnicity includes a 
cultural heritage of chaotic street carnivals and recreational marijuana use, and in my 
opinion this makes Afro-Caribbean British ethnicity more pernicious than White 
British ethnicity’? 
 Notwithstanding this last point, the aforementioned worry about how legal 
professionals might come to enforce laws banning incitement to religious hatred was 
subsequently addressed head-on by members of the House of Lords (notably Lords 
Hunt, Lester, Carey, and Plant). In October 2005 the Lords succeeded in amending 
the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill by inserting s 29J. 
 
Protection of freedom of expression: Nothing in this Part shall be read or given 
effect in a way which prohibits or restricts discussion, criticism or expressions of 
antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular religions or the beliefs or 
practices of their adherents, or of any other belief system or the beliefs or 
                                            
57 Supra note 55. 
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practices of its adherents, or proselytising or urging adherents of a different 
religion or belief system to cease practising their religion or belief system. 58 
 
What this seems to show is that laws banning incitement to religious hatred may 
require very careful drafting and a relatively narrow specification in order to minimise 
any negative impact on freedom of expression.59 What it does not show, however, is 
that laws banning incitement to religious hatred are invariably and irredeemably more 
hostile to free speech interests than other similar laws.60 After all, a similar need for 
careful drafting and narrow specification was present when the government 
introduced a new offence of stirring up hatred on grounds of sexual orientation and no 
doubt the same need would also be present if the government sought to create yet 
further stirring up hatred offences to cover disability and gender identity.61 
 To expand on these last observations, when the government introduced the 
Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill62 concerns were raised that legal professionals 
would find it hard to distinguish between speech that constitutes stirring up hatred on 
grounds of sexual orientation and speech that is merely religiously motivated criticism 
of homosexual conduct. Yet Lord Waddington successfully put forward an 
amendment that was designed to limit the perceived threat to relevant free speech 
interests, in a parallel fashion to s 29J of the Public Order Act 1986. Consequently, 
the Public Order Act 1986 now also contains s 29JA. 
 
Protection of freedom of expression (sexual orientation): (1) In this Part, for the 
avoidance of doubt, the discussion or criticism of sexual conduct or practices or 
the urging of persons to refrain from or modify such conduct or practices shall 
not be taken of itself to be threatening or intended to stir up hatred. (2) In this 
Part, for the avoidance of doubt, any discussion or criticism of marriage which 
concerns the sex of the parties to marriage shall not be taken of itself to be 
threatening or intended to stir up hatred.63 
 
Thus far the courts have not found it impossible in practice to distinguish between 
speech that stirs up hatred against homosexuals and speech that merely expresses 
religionists interpretations of religious texts on the subject of homosexual conduct.64 
                                            
58 Ibid. 
59 Cf Ian Leigh, “Homophobic Speech, Equality Denial, and Religious Expression” in Ivan 
Hare & James Weinstein, eds, Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009) 375 at 387. 
60 Cf Hare, “Crosses”, supra note 54 at 537-38. 
61 See, e.g., Stanton-Ife, supra note 30 at paras 66, 84-85. 
62 Bill 16-I, 2007-2008 sess, 2008. 
63 Supra note 39, as amended by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (UK), c 4 
[Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008] and the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 
(UK), c 30 [Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013]. 
64 Consider the English case R v. Ali, Javed, and Ahmed (2012) No. T20110109, Derby Cr. 
Ct., 10 February. In July 2010 three devout but also socially conservative members of the 
Muslim faith distributed leaflets on the streets of Derby titled ‘Turn or Burn’, ‘GAY – God 
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Intriguingly, the same arguments are now being played out vis-à-vis the possibility of 
a third major extension of the stirring up hatred offences in England and Wales to 
cover disability and gender identity. Some of the individuals and organisations who 
participated in the Law Commission’s consultation exercise on this issue argued that 
“such new offences would stifle legitimate criticism of gender reassignment 
surgery”.65 However, this only invites the following obvious response: why not 
simply introduce bespoke freedom of expression clauses for disability and gender 
identity? Let us suppose for the sake of argument that legal professionals could, 
without too much difficulty, appeal to the freedom of expression clause s 29JA, along 
with other elements of the offence of stirring up hatred on grounds of sexual 
orientation, in order to distinguish between ‘We must all hate gays because that is all 
they deserve as much for the HIV epidemic they brought to the world as for the 
rampant paedophilia they are responsible for, and when we finally come together in 
our hatred of gays they had better watch out!’ and ‘I urge you to stop engaging in 
homosexual conduct’, and in order to distinguish between ‘If you want to be at peace 
with God you must all hate gays as much as God hates gays, and when we finally 
come together in our hatred of gays they had better watch out!’ and ‘My religion tells 
me that homosexual acts are sinful in the eyes of God.’ Surely legal professionals 
could also appeal to a bespoke freedom of expression clause, along with other 
elements of a new offence of stirring up hatred on grounds of gender identity, say, in 
order to distinguish between ‘I tell you that we as real women have no option but to 
hate and despise so-called trans women because they are at the vanguard of ever-more 
extreme forms of male dominance over women, and I can also promise you that when 
we as real women do unite in our hatred of these imposters they had better watch out!’ 
and ‘Female sex/gender is a complex identity that depends on innumerable distinctive 
childhood and adult experiences that are themselves shaped by a mixture of biology 
and cultural context in myriad ways that could never be achieved or simulated by sex 
reassignment surgery and hormone therapy alone.’ 
 Of course, some people may find any such clauses unsatisfactory as mitigation 
strategies in response to the threat to free speech interests posed by incitement to 
hatred laws. But then the question becomes whether there is anything unique or 
special about disability and gender identity as far as these mitigation strategies are 
concerned. Is there any basis on which to think that inserting bespoke freedom of 
expression clauses into the relevant offences for disability or gender identity will be 
                                                                                                                             
Abhors You’, ‘Death Penalty?’ as a protest to the Gay Pride Festival taking place that day. 
They became the first people to be successfully prosecuted for offences relating to stirring up 
hatred on grounds of sexual orientation in England and Wales. In his sentencing remarks 
Judge Burgess made reference to clause 29JA (that denouncing homosexual practices as 
immoral shall not be taken of itself to be threatening or intended to stir up hatred) but 
nevertheless supported the jury’s decision that in this particular case the wording of the 
leaflets did amount to the use of threatening words or behavior with the intention of stirring 
up hatred. Transcript obtained directly from Judge Burgess. 
65 Law Commission, supra note 12 at para 7.41. 
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inherently less effective in mitigating the threat to valuable speech than the similar 
clauses employed in the existing offences of stirring up hatred on grounds of religion 
and on grounds of sexual orientation? If there is such a basis, I cannot see what it is. 
So if there are sound bases for rejecting the freedom of expression clause strategy for 
mitigating the threat to free speech interests, then surely these grounds would apply 
equally to a range of protected characteristics, perhaps all characteristics, and not just 
to disability and gender identity uniquely.66 
 A related worry might be that it is especially difficult in the case of religion as 
opposed to race for legal professionals to distinguish between speech that is intended 
to stir up hatred against a group or class of persons and speech that is simply intended 
to express hatred for that group or class of persons. But, once again, it is hard to see 
the rational basis for this worry. Compare a person who stands on Oxford Street with 
a megaphone proclaiming ‘Listen to me, you must understand that all Muslims are 
wife-beaters and jihadists and as such deserve only our hatred and hostility, and trust 
me when I say that they should tremble at what is in store for them when we finally 
open our eyes to who they really are’ with a person who stands on Regent Street with 
a megaphone declaring ‘Deep down you know that all niggers are layabouts and 
thieves and so please don’t be afraid to hate these people because hating them will be 
the first step along a patriotic path to sending them back to the jungle with their tails 
behind them, and at the point of a gun.’ It is a matter for the interpretation of courts, 
based on the contexts of utterance and the states of mind of the speakers, whether 
either of these utterances are deliberate attempts to stir up hatred or merely attempts to 
express hatred. But it strikes me that the first case is no lesser a clear-cut example of 
stirring up hatred than the second case despite the fact that the first case concerns the 
religion of the targeted group and the second case concerns the race of the targeted 
group. I do not deny that these sorts of cases may pose significant challenges for the 
police, prosecutors, magistrates, judges and juries. Rather, my point is that there does 
not seem to be any difference in propositional content that would make stirring up 
hatred inherently more difficult to identify in the case of religion than in the case of 
race. 
 But perhaps I am missing the point. Maybe the real concern is not that it is harder 
to distinguish between the speech act of stirring up hatred against other people and 
alternative types of speech act in the case of religion than in the case of race but 
instead that the value of speech which is used to stir up hatred tends to be higher in 
the case of religion than in the case of race and this alters the balance of interests. 
How so? One thought might be that the words people use to stir up religious hatred 
fall into the category of political speech, whereas words used to stir up racial hatred 
do not. And since political speech should be protected due to democratic interests we 
all share (so the argument goes), the case for incitement to religious hatred laws is 
harder to make than for incitement to racial hatred laws.67 However, it is difficult to 
sustain this distinction as soon as one reflects on the fact that very often people also 
                                            
66 Cf ibid at para 7.43. 
67 Cf Vance, supra note 54 at 205. 
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use highly politicised racist hate propaganda in order to stir up racial hatred.68 Then 
again, a second, even more general distinction is that when it comes to stirring up 
racial hatred nothing is ever said that deserves to be protected − because, for example, 
the words or sentences used to stir up racial hatred always either express malicious 
falsehoods on matters of fact or amount to nothing more than mindless outpourings of 
emotion that fail to connote any actual ideas or opinions − whereas what passes for 
stirring up of religious hatred is invariably worth protecting − because, for example, 
the relevant words or sentences never express malicious falsehoods on matters of fact 
and are always vessels for actual ideas and opinions, such as ideas about how certain 
people’s commitment to their religious doctrines causes them to behave in savage or 
uncivilised ways.69 But, once again, the distinction seems unfounded. On the one 
hand, surely the stirring up of racial hatred can, and often does, take the form of 
words or sentences that connote actual ideas or opinions, including ideas about the 
alleged moral inferiority of certain races.70 On the other hand, it is surely not difficult 
to imagine instances of stirring up religious hatred involving words or sentences 
which are either malicious falsehoods on matters of fact (‘Each and every Muslim on 
this street is directly involved in plotting terrorist attacks’) or mindless outpourings 
that do not connote any actual ideas or opinions but instead express non-cognitive 
attitudes or feelings such as disapproval, contempt or hatred (‘Damn Muslims!’). 
 So far I have talked about the balancing of interests with a special emphasis on 
the interests of speakers and audiences. Another potential way of approaching this 
sort of balancing is to place extra weight on the interests of those who are the objects 
of the stirring up of hatred. This is about weighing up the extent to which members of 
groups identified by given characteristics have a greater interest in legal protections 
against people stirring up hatred against them or a greater interest in enjoying 
unqualified freedom of expression themselves, including the freedom to engage in 
speech that potentially could be construed by the police and the courts as stirring up 
hatred against others. This is likely to involve highly contextual judgements, 
depending on the group, the society and the moment in history. In the case of racial 
minorities in the US, for example, several scholars have highlighted the way in which 
historically oppressed citizens have utilised their right to freedom of expression 
enshrined in the First Amendment to campaign for civil rights legislation that 
prohibits religious, racial, ethnic, and other forms of discrimination.71 On one 
                                            
68 See, e.g., R v Birdwood (1995) No. 94/2421/X2, EWCA Crim, 11 April (involving the 
dissemination of an anti-Semitic pamphlet to all MPs, MEPs and all those on the Church of 
England’s yearbook list). 
69 See, e.g.,Vance, supra note 54 at 244; Randall Hansen, “The Danish Cartoon Controversy: 
A Defence of Liberal Freedom” (2006) 44:5 Int’l Migration 7 at 12; Hare, “Crosses”, supra 
note 54 at 534. 
70 See, e.g., R v Sheppard and Whittle (2009) No. T20080094, Leeds Cr. Ct., 10 July 
(involving the possession, publication and distribution in print and through a website of 
material expressing the moral inferiority of certain races). 
71 See, e.g., Samuel Walker, In Defense of American Liberties: A History of the ACLU (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Samuel Walker, Hate Speech: The History of an 
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interpretation of these events, for these groups to now claim protection through hate 
speech laws would be, first, a gross betrayal of the very constitutional essential that 
enabled them to achieve the advances they have made and, second, ill-advised given 
that they may continue to need protection under the First Amendment in order to 
campaign vigorously for other issues in the future and to prevent any retrenchment of 
hard won advances.72 As Martha Zingo puts it, “the harms arising from hate speech 
may involve less risk for lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, and transgenderists than the 
potentially greater threat (in both kind and duration) posed by censoring speech.”73 
 It is certainly true that any group claiming protection through hate speech laws 
also risks having those same or similar laws turned against their own speech. 
Nevertheless, I think it right to acknowledge that there is a genuine dilemma or 
quandary for groups who find themselves the objects of hate speech. From the 
perspective of these groups there are benefits as well as risks associated with hate 
speech laws. Consider sexual orientation. “While restrictions on hate propaganda 
might be manipulated in discriminatory ways, such restrictions might also embolden 
sexual minorities to express their sexuality publicly.”74 Moreover, there are risks 
associated with constitutional rules disallowing hate speech laws as well as risks 
associated with hate speech laws themselves. Thus, “just as rules of law allowing the 
repression of speech are used against lesbians, so too are rules of law forbidding the 
repression of speech.”75 Therefore, “[t]hat lesbians and others fighting against the 
repression of lesbian speech often rely on the rule of law’s enshrinement of free 
speech should not necessarily be determinative of issues relating to hate crimes 
involving speech.”76 Speaking now of the UK specifically, I do not believe that it has 
to be the case, nor should it be the case, that being the object of speech that stirs up 
hatred is a price that people must pay in order to enjoy the right to freedom of 
expression. On the contrary, it is quite possible that narrowly specified and sensibly 
enforced stirring up hatred offences could protect people from gratuitous hate speech 
without at the same time gratuitously infringing their own right to freedom of 
expression. But even if people do face a genuine quandary, this quandary is not, at 
least in the UK at the present time, substantially different for people identified by 
their disability or gender identity as it is for people identified by their race, religion or 
                                                                                                                             
American Controversy (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994); William B Rubenstein, 
“Since When is the Fourteenth Amendment Our Route to Equality? Some Reflections on the 
Construction of the ‘Hate-Speech’ Debate from a Lesbian/Gay Perspective” in Henry Louis 
Gates Jr et al, eds, Speaking of Race, Speaking of Sex: Hate Speech, Civil Rights, and Civil 
Liberties (New York: New York University Press, 1994) 280 [Rubenstein, “Since”]; 
Richards, “Free Speech”, supra note 43. 
72 See, e.g., Rubenstein, “Since”, supra note 71 at 21-22; Nadine Strossen, “Incitement to 
Hatred: Should There Be a Limit?” (2001) 25:2 S Ill ULJ 243 at 262-66. 
73 Zingo, supra note 46 at 178. 
74 Cohen, “More Censorship”, supra note 8 at 92. 
75 Ruthann Robson, Lesbian (Out)law: Survival Under the Rule of Law (Ithaca: Firebrand 
Books, 1992) at 154 [Robson]. 
76 Ibid. 
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sexual orientation. In other words, if there is a risk that people will fall foul of the 
very stirring up offences that were designed to protect them, at first glance this risk 
does not seem any greater or lesser for people with disabilities or people with 
transgender identities than it does for Jews, Muslims, gays and lesbians.  
 Reflecting on all this, what should we say about the functional approach in 
general? Two problems are worth highlighting. The first problem is that a given hate 
speech law might secure multiple functions and in turn those different functions might 
support drawing the scope of that law differently. In other words, there could be 
indeterminacy of judgment when using this approach by itself. This problem mainly 
stems from the fact that the functional approach is itself an umbrella strategy covering 
a variety of different functional arguments. To illustrate the problem, let us suppose 
for the sake of argument that the aim of optimally balancing interests supports the 
enactment of laws banning incitement to racial hatred but not laws banning incitement 
to religious hatred. (I am sceptical about this, however let us assume it is true in spite 
of my scepticism.) What if other functional arguments suggest a different strategy? It 
could be that having laws on the books banning both incitement to racial hatred and 
incitement to religious hatred helps to send out a message that both racial and 
religious groups, both Jews and Muslims, for instance, are valued members of society. 
Or consider once more the functional arguments which say that incitement to religious 
hatred laws no less than incitement to racial hatred laws can be important tools in 
combating speech that contributes to climates of hatred and fear − climates in which 
there is an increased risk of acts of discrimination or violence and a heightened sense 
of insecurity. The upshot is that even if some functional arguments would 
differentiate between the stirring up of racial hatred and the stirring up of religious 
hatred, other functional arguments might not. In other words, whereas some 
functional arguments may permit exceptions to the principle of parity (treating like 
groups alike), others might point in the direction of upholding the principle of parity. 
 A second problem − or set of problems − stems from the fact that the internal 
logic of a purely functional approach to the issue of scope seems to imply moving 
beyond broadly defined characteristics such as race, religion, sexual orientation, 
disability, gender identity, and so on, in order to differentiate between relevant sub-
groups. Not race but particular races; not religion but particular religions; not sexual 
orientation but particular orientations; not disability but particular disabilities; not 
gender identity but particular gender identities; and so on. For example, one possible 
reason for limiting the scope of incitement to hatred laws to particular sub-groups 
rather than the broader characteristics themselves has to do with the two step 
argument concerning the climate of hatred touched upon earlier. The first step links 
stirring up hatred to the climate of hatred. One can certainly imagine, for example, a 
scenario in which, due to the high incidence of speech that stirs up hatred against 
Muslims or due to the pre-existing conditions that are conducive to such speech 
producing a climate of hatred against Muslims, marginal instances of stirring up 
hatred against this particular sub-group make a larger contribution to, or do more to 
accelerate the growth of, the climate of hatred than general instances of stirring up 
hatred on grounds of the broader characteristic, religion. The fact that there is this 
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greater contribution or tipping point could conceivably support limiting the scope of 
the relevant legislation to just the sub-group. The second step in the argument links 
the climate of hatred to an increased risk of acts of discrimination or violence. Once 
again, it could turn out to be the case that the climate of hatred which surrounds the 
particular sub-group, Muslims, comprises an especially heightened risk of acts of 
discrimination or violence as compared to the general climate of hatred, if, indeed, 
there is one, surrounding the broad characteristic, religion. Again, this heightened risk 
may warrant a legislative focus on the sub-group. The problem is, however, that the 
splintering of this body of law may attract a series of objections on the part of 
overlooked sub-groups that do not receive similar protections: namely, that hate 
speech laws violate the principle of parity. Lack of parity might also threaten the 
public good of political stability. It is surely feasible that a government regime that 
offers protection against hate speech to some religious sub-groups but not to others 
may be a little bit less stable than one that ensures protection for all religious sub-
groups. These same problems are likely to arise when there is differential treatment of 
sub-groups under the broader categories of race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, 
disability, gender identity, and so on. Lack of parity may also breed or exacerbate 
broader social tensions between sub-groups. Specifically, it might provide people with 
yet another source of motivation for engaging in hate speech, and yet another source 
of inspiration for innovations in the shape and content of that hate speech going 
forward. In this way, choosing to protect a particular sub-group against incitement to 
hatred because they are especially susceptible to the relevant social evils might turn 
out to be a type of self-fulfilling prophecy, and not in a good way. 
 Related to this problem are various feasibility issues surrounding the introduction 
of new hate speech laws. Recall from Part 1 the list of hate speech laws grouped 
together based on the characteristics being protected. It is noticeable that some laws 
protect HIV/AIDS status (e.g., Australian Capital Territory (Australia),77 New South 
Wales (Australia)78) rather than medical status in general, including suffering from 
any series disease (e.g., Facebook79). Many laws specify disability as a protected 
characteristic rather than the more general category of human capability or 
functioning which includes ability or disability. As a result it remains permissible for 
people with disabilities to stir up hatred against other people on grounds of their being 
TABs or temporarily able-bodied. Some university anti-harassment policies (or 
campus speech codes) protect veteran status but do not seem to cover discriminatory 
harassment against people who are pacifists. In the case of sex or gender identity, 
some laws do not specify which sub-groups are protected meaning that, in theory, all 
sub-groups are protected including man, woman, male, female, cisgender, 
transgender, cissexual, transsexual, third gender, bigender, pangender, agender, 
                                            
77 Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT), ss 65, 66(1)(d), 67(1)(d)(iv) [Discrimination Act 1991]. 
78 Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), ss 49ZXA-49ZXC [Anti-Discrimination Act 1977]. 
79 See Facebook Community Standards, Encouraging Respectful Behaviour, Hate Speech, 
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intersex, third sex (e.g., Tasmania (Australia)80), whereas others specify only 
transgender (e.g., New South Wales (Australia)81). Some laws appear to protect 
various forms of sexual orientation including heterosexual, homosexual, lesbian, 
bisexual, and asexual (e.g., Northern Ireland (UK),82 England and Wales (UK),83 
Tasmania (Australia),84 Australian Capital Territory (Australia)85), while others name 
only homosexuality (e.g., New South Wales (Australia)86). These laws are not limited 
to incitement to hatred laws, but the question of whether to protect sub-groups rather 
than general characteristics is as germane for incitement to hatred laws as for any hate 
speech laws. One relevant feasibility issue is the heavy evidential burden placed on 
legislators in identifying various sub-groups and determining how they compare with 
each other in relation to the relevant social evils. Processes of commissioning, 
receiving and digesting relevant research evidence could delay legislation for years 
and in some cases may even kick it into the long grass, but in the meantime the 
stirring up of hatred goes on unabated. Furthermore, facts about how different sub-
groups compare to one another in relation to the relevant social evils are not static but 
change over time as circumstances change. And so if authorities want the body of law 
to reflect the fluidity of facts on the ground, there may be an impetus to create new 
stirring up hatred offences, then repeal them, then re-enact them, then repeal them, 
and so on, over relatively short periods of time. Given that parliamentary time is an 
extremely scarce and valuable resource, there would be considerable opportunity 
costs associated with adopting a highly fluid legislative programme. The net result 
might be that governments refrain from enacting any incitement to hatred laws for 
fear of committing themselves to the need for unlimited future changes to the law. In 
addition, it is surely a desideratum of any desirable legislative programme that the 
public will be able to keep up with changes so that at any given time they can predict 
or foresee, with a reasonable degree of certainty, whether or not their conduct is likely 
to be deemed a criminal offence by the police and the courts. In that sense a hokey 
cokey legislative programme may not be conducive to the rule of law. Moreover, the 
splintering of the scope of incitement to hatred laws in terms of sub-groups may also 
pose not insignificant technical challenges for authorities in terms of drafting and 
enforcing these laws, such as finding workable legal definitions of the relevant sub-
groups that can be rationally applied to concrete cases. 
 The aforementioned problems suggest, I think, at least two important things about 
how the functional approach relates to other approaches. The first is that other 
                                            
80 Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas), ss 16(ea), 17(1)(ea) [Anti-Discrimination Act 1998]. 
81 Anti-Discrimination Act 1977, supra note 78 at ss 38R, 38S, 38T. 
82 The Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987, SI 1987/463 (NI 7), ss 8-13. 
83 Public Order Act 1986, supra note 39, ss 29AB, 29JA, as amended by the Criminal Justice 
and Immigration Act 2008, supra note 63, and the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, 
supra note 63. 
84 Anti-Discrimination Act 1998, supra note 80 at ss 16, 17(1)(c), 19(c). 
85 Discrimination Act 1991, supra note 77 at ss 66(1)(b), 67(1)(d)(ii). 
86 Anti-Discrimination Act 1977, supra note 78 at ss 49ZS, 49ZT, 49ZTA. 
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approaches will be indispensible in circumstances where different functional 
arguments point in different directions concerning whether or not to include a given 
characteristic under the scope of incitement to hatred laws. The second is that other 
approaches are likely to be highly relevant in deciding just how far to pursue the logic 
of given functional arguments concerning the proper scope of incitement to hatred 
laws, such as whether to frame these laws in terms of broad categories like race, 
religion, sexual orientation, capacity, gender identity, and so on, or in terms of 
particular sub-categories like black, Muslim, gay, disabled, transgender, and so on. 
What these two problems do not suggest, however, is that the functional approach 
should play no role whatsoever in determining the proper scope of incitement to 
hatred laws. 
 
II. Democratic specification 
 
A final approach to specifying the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws places an 
emphasis on whatever scope best meets the special demands of democracy. This 
could take different forms, of course, depending on how these special demands are 
understood. One possibility is that it could be a matter of looking at whether or not 
certain groups in a democracy, perhaps because they are historically oppressed, have 
made demands for protection consistently over a prolonged period of time and for 
good reason or with justifiable cause. And so, when leaders within the UK Muslim 
community put requests to successive Home Secretaries for an extension of the 
existing stirring up hatred offences to cover Muslims, and did so consistently over a 
prolonged period of time and with justifiable cause, in the end it was fitting, 
democratically speaking, to introduce a new stirring up religious hatred offence (so 
the argument goes). Consider the words of the then Home Secretary, David Blunkett 
MP, who in 2001 sought (but failed at that time) to introduce a new stirring up 
religious hatred offence through the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill.87 
 
The debate on this subject has been going on for a long time. We were approached 
by leaders of the Muslim community − it was a representative leadership group − 
who thought that it was only right, fair and protective to include religion with race in 
terms of avoiding incitement to hate using the Public Order Act 1986. I considered 
that and decided that their point was fair and reasonable.88 
 
 There again, if democracy is about instituting rules that serve the wishes of the 
people who must live under the dominion of those rules, then it is unclear why any 
particular constituencies of society should have a privileged position. The 
democratically expressed wishes of hate speakers are as much a part of democracy as 
the wishes of those who are the objects of their hate speech. People who think it is 
their right to stir up hatred against persons identified by a transgender identity, for 
                                            
87 Bill 49, 2001-2002 sess, 2001. 
88 UK, HC, House of Commons Debates, vol 375, col 34 (19 November 2001). 
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example, are likely to demand that transgender identity is not treated as a protected 
characteristic for the purposes of incitement to hatred laws, whereas at least some of 
the people with a transgender identity against whom hatred is being stirred up are 
likely to demand the opposite. Faced with these conflicting wishes, authorities may 
find it difficult to justify ranking the wishes of hate speakers above the wishes of 
people who are the subject of hate speech but also vice versa, even if they accept the 
principle that a democratic society is one whose rules serve the wishes of the people.  
 Perhaps instead we should focus on the idea of democracy as a society organised 
according to rules that it gives to itself via systems of majority voting. In the case of 
representative democracy, this would involve a society electing political 
representatives to vote on the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws.89 So, for 
example, in 2004 the two main opposition parties in the UK made it clear to the 
Labour government that they would not support the introduction of a new stirring up 
religious hatred offence via the Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill.90 The 
government had to wait until the 2005 general election to cement its democratic 
mandate before introducing the bespoke Racial and Religious Hatred Bill.91 Viewing 
the “Who?” question in these terms might enable a reformulation of some of the 
distinctions introduced in Part 1. Thus, the distinction between unchosen and chosen 
characteristics could be reformulated not as a metaphysical or sociological distinction 
but rather as a democratic distinction. In short, the real distinction is between 
characteristics that a society or its democratically elected representatives does or does 
not decide to treat as unchosen (quite apart from whether or not they are in fact 
unchosen) for the purposes of framing the scope of incitement to hatred laws.92  
 Yet there are also some defects in this way of approaching the proper scope of 
incitement to hatred laws that may render it implausible as the sole approach. No 
society, and no body of elected representatives, will be unanimous about which, if 
any, characteristics it wants to protect under incitement to hatred laws and which it 
does not. At best a majority of democratic representatives will be reflecting a majority 
held view in society, and sometimes not even that. Moreover, what if the majority acts 
in extreme ways that wholly ignore the rights of the minority? 
 Part of the value of a constitutional democracy (it is often assumed) is that it 
provides checks and balances against potentially extreme results of majoritarian 
democratic decision-making. For the time being, the Human Rights Act 1998,93 and 
with it the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), provides checks and balances against 
the decisions of the UK parliament vis-à-vis citizens’ basic human rights, including in 
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91 Supra note 55. 
92 Cf Robert C Post, “Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment” (1991) 32:2 Wm 
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the area of criminal law. If, post-Brexit, the UK government opts to repeal the Human 
Rights Act 1998 in favour of a British bill of rights, then this bill of rights will provide 
the sorts of rights-based constraints upon which the legitimacy of democratic 
government depends (it might be argued). If so, then arguably rights-based 
democracy-protecting and democracy-constituting checks and balances as well as 
majoritarian democratic decision-making should be key factors in determining the 
proper scope of incitement to hatred laws under the present democratic approach. Of 
course, this could also mean that the present approach is a subset of the functional 
specification approach. This is not to say it is necessarily wrong, of course. At any 
rate, what implications will this have for questions of scope? For one thing, it could 
mean that there is an impetus for the scope of hate speech laws to harmonise with the 
scope of human rights. The Human Rights Act 1998 gives effect to the rights set out in 
the ECHR. As mentioned in Part 1, Art 14 makes it clear that ‘[t]he enjoyment of the 
rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, 
birth or other status’. And Art 10(2) states that the exercise of the right to freedom of 
expression protected under Art 10(1) may be restricted by laws that ‘are necessary in 
a democratic society’.94 Together these might suggest incitement to hatred laws whose 
scope includes political opinion as a protected characteristic, for example. A British 
bill or rights might also incorporate the idea that the right to freedom of expression is 
fundamental but not absolute, and may be limited for the sake of democratic values, 
albeit it might suggest a more limited scope in terms of protected characteristics. 
 The key point here is that the issue of what, if any, limitations on freedom of 
expression are necessary in a democratic society is contested, and this will inevitably 
have implications for the “Who?” question. Both Robert Post and James Weinstein 
have sought to recast the relationship between the right to freedom of expression and 
the ideal of democratic self-government by highlighting an earlier stage in the 
democratic process. On their approach, what really matters is the rights of individuals 
to participate in the formation of public opinion upon which the familiar mechanisms 
of democratic decision-making are based. They argue that any hate speech laws which 
restrict public discourse cannot be warranted regardless of their scope.95 However, 
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arguably some hate speech laws, even those that restrict the opportunities of hate 
speakers to choose their preferred modes of speech, delivery and timing when 
participating in public discourse, can be pro tanto warranted if they operate for the 
sake of ensuring that all citizens enjoy real opportunities to participate in public 
discourse. The basic concern here is that, if left unchecked, certain forms of hate 
speech can deter or inhibit members of targeted groups from functioning as ordinary 
deliberative democrats. What is at stake is a sort of deliberative exclusion in which, 
out of fear for their personal safety or livelihood or as a result of an impaired sense of 
their status, some, perhaps many, victims of hate speech might (i) refrain from 
participating in the formation of public opinion; (ii) adapt their expressed preferences 
in order to fit their reduced circumstances; or (iii) discover that even when they do 
decide to speak up what they say falls on deaf ears because of the low opinion that 
others have of them.96 Part 3A of the Public Order Act 198697 sets out offences of 
using ‘threatening words or behaviour’ to stir up hatred against people on grounds of 
their religion or sexual orientation. At first glance, this restrictive wording is hard to 
understand. If the concern is ultimately with the likelihood of hatred being stirred up, 
why restrict the offenses to only threatening words or behavior? Why not also include 
insulting, derogatory, stigmatising, or defamatory words? One possible answer is that 
these offences are designed to protect the subjective element of insecurity, people’s 
sense of fear and insecurity. And so, these stirring up offences are designed to deter 
the sort of incitement to hatred that not merely creates a climate of hatred but also a 
climate of fear and insecurity. The current line of argument looks to the knock on 
effects of a climate of fear and insecurity measured in terms of a loss of real 
opportunities to participate in public discourse, as in, opportunities that are free from 
fear. Once again, it is not hard to see how these sorts of arguments might be plausibly 
applied not merely to what are the currently protected characteristics of race, religion 
and sexual orientation under the stirring up hatred offences in England and Wales but 
also to disability and gender identity in the event that the stirring up of hatred also 
creates a climate of fear and insecurity that silences members of these other 
historically victimised and still vulnerable groups or classes of people. 
 Notwithstanding these points, it might be argued that I have missed the true 
purpose of protecting fundamental rights, such as the right to freedom of expression, 
within a constitutional democracy. It is, as Ronald Dworkin argues, to ensure the 
democratic legitimacy of all other laws.98 To explain, Dworkin argues that if we, as a 
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democratic society, introduce “upstream” hate speech regulations and thereby 
“intervene too soon in the process through which collective opinion is formed”, then 
“we spoil the only democratic justification we have for insisting that everyone obey 
[downstream] laws”,99 including antidiscrimination laws that also protect the very 
groups claiming protecting under hate speech regulations. Consider an example due to 
Waldron.100 Suppose an English landlord discriminates against families of South 
Asian descent in a way that is prohibited by English antidiscrimination laws. At the 
same time, English laws banning the stirring up of racial hatred prevent the landlord 
from using threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour with either the 
intention or likelihood of stirring up hatred against Pakistanis defined as a racial, 
ethnic or national group. This means the Landlord is restricted from participating, in 
the ways he might prefer to participate, in public discourse and the formation of 
public opinion about the antidiscrimination laws he objects to. On Dworkin’s analysis 
(pace Waldron101), this has a significant negative impact on the legitimacy of those 
same antidiscrimination laws. How so? One possible explanation invokes Justice 
Scalia’s metaphor of expecting some people to follow the Marquis of Queensberry 
rules whilst their opponents fight freestyle.102 The stirring up racial hatred offences 
prevent the landlord from using threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour 
with either the intention or likelihood of stirring up hatred against Pakistanis or 
against supporters of the antidiscrimination laws identified racially. But at the same 
time these offences do not currently prevent Pakistanis or any defenders of the 
antidiscrimination laws from using threatening, abusive or insulting words or 
behaviour with either the intention or likelihood of stirring up hatred against landlords 
identified as a group or class of persons in virtue of being landlords.103 
 However, notice that this particular explanation of why incitement to hatred laws 
in England and Wales (and other countries) damage the legitimacy of so-called 
downstream laws makes an assumption that no sensible incitement to hatred laws 
would include among the relevant protected characteristics the characteristic of 
landlord along with the more conventional characteristics race, ethnicity, nationality, 
religion, sexual orientation, disability, gender identity, and so on. But this assumption 
may not be as sound as it first appears, especially if there are solid philosophical 
reasons for the inclusion of the broader characteristic profession as a protected 
characteristic. Thus, as I discussed in Part 1, suppose one believes that the proper 
scope of incitement to hatred laws should be determined partly on the basis of 
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whichever characteristics, social identities or statuses tend to be an integral feature of 
the subjective personal identities of the people who posses them. It might be argued 
that for many people profession is something they accept or adopt as a central part of 
who they really are.104 At any rate, one cannot simply discount out of hand the idea 
that hate speech laws should also include profession as a protected characteristic 
without appealing to a comprehensive theory of the proper scope of hate speech laws, 
that is, without having a good answer to the “Who?” question that takes into 
consideration various different approaches to answering that question. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
Across Parts 1 and 2 I have outlined and evaluated five main approaches to specifying 
the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws. In doing so I have suggested strengths 
as well as weaknesses in each of the approaches. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, my 
overall conclusion is that the correct answer to the question ‘How do we decide who 
should be protected by incitement to hatred laws?’ is this: ‘With a combination of all 
five approaches.’ No specification would be adequate, I believe, that appealed 
exclusively to any one of these approaches. Conversely, a specification would be 
lacking or incomplete if it disregarded entirely any one of these approaches. To be 
specific, I think one would be hard pressed to say that parity and consistency alone 
can determine the proper scope of incitement to hatred laws, but, conversely, it would 
be too big a jump to conclude that consistency or parity have no relevance to these 
questions whatsoever. When legislators in England and Wales have sought to create 
new stirring up hatred offences they have not, at least not since 1965, done so with a 
tabula rasa. Existing stirring up hatred offences have invited arguments based on 
principles of parity and consistency − principles that may have inherent as well as 
instrumental value. By the same token, the idea that authorities could create a new 
offence purely for the sake of parity, say, even though there are no actual occurrences 
of prosecutable cases, may sound a little absurd to some people (“political correctness 
gone mad”). Then again, practical specification only asks if there is a phenomenon of 
stirring up hatred on grounds of a given characteristic and if, practically speaking, 
there is something that could be done about it through the creation of new offences. 
What it cannot tell us is whether or not it would be right to introduce such new 
offences. Likewise, formal specifications could never tell the whole story about the 
proper scope of incitement to hatred laws partly because understanding the full 
significance of formal qualities often depends on thinking about the underlying 
function or purpose of these laws. On the other hand, arguably formal distinctions add 
sophistication to the way we compare and contrast different characteristics, especially 
when applying the principle of parity (treating like groups alike), because they help us 
to know the deeper and myriad ways characteristics can be alike or unalike. As for 
functional specifications, these use the underlying or real function or purpose of 
incitement to hatred laws in order to shape the scope of such laws. Nevertheless, from 
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the mere fact that creating a new stirring up hatred offence for a given characteristic 
would serve the basic function or purpose of incitement to hatred laws in general, one 
cannot safely assume that this would be the proper thing to do, bearing in mind 
practical and formal considerations. That being said, surely it would be irrational, 
impossible even, to completely ignore or set aside functional considerations, to detach 
the “Who?” question from the “Why?” question. Finally, democratic specifications 
speak to how the scope of incitement to hatred laws may or may not meet the special 
demands of democracy. But it is not hard to think of reasons why allowing 
majoritarian decision-making alone to determine scope may be unwise. For its part, 
the idea of constitutional democracy may well rely on ideas of what is necessary in a 
democratic society that in turn rely on functional specifications. On the other hand, 
any approach that rejected the special demands of democracy altogether would seem 
to ignore, violate even, what lends special value and even legitimacy to the very 
systems of government in which incitement to hatred laws operate.  
 But if the best approach is one that combines all five approaches, how is that 
combination to be done? What does it look like? My view is that the most likely 
combination is not going to be a strict hierarchy or lexical priority. I think it extremely 
unlikely, in other words, that consistency, practical, formal, functional and democratic 
specifications can be put into an obvious or self-evident single rank order, so that 
whichever approach is ranked first determines the proper scope, the second breaks 
any ties remaining from applying the first, the third breaks any ties remaining from 
applying the second, and so on. For example, it might be tempting to think that 
functional specification is lexically prior given the role it can often play in motivating, 
limiting and in some instances substantiating arguments within the other four 
approaches. Yet it would be quite dogmatic, I think, to suppose that the underlying or 
real function or purpose of incitement to hatred laws could in theory settle the issue of 
the scope of such laws in a way that effectively trumps anything that the consistency, 
practical, formal and democratic approaches may have to say.  
 I also think that any talk of achieving an optimum “balance” or “trade-off” 
between the five approaches assumes something about the commensurability of these 
approaches that is actually belied by their plural and heterogeneous nature. So if not 
balancing then what? I have argued elsewhere that the question ‘Can hate speech laws 
be warranted?’ must be settled through compromise,105 and I am inclined to say that 
the same can, and should, be said in response to the question ‘What is the right 
combination of approaches to determining the proper scope of hate speech laws?’. In 
other words, the best strategy is one that combines together all five approaches in 
reasonable ways given the fact that sometimes it will be necessary to compromise 
some approaches for others if it is not possible to honour all approaches at the same 
time: that is, if each approach points to a slightly different scope. 
 Clearly context will also be important for how any reasonable compromise of 
approaches plays out. The main point I wish to make about context is that many of the 
considerations which I have put forward in Parts 1 and 2 will take on different 
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dimensions depending on the social, legal and political conditions of the given 
country. In England and Wales, for example, some people argue that in order to 
justify the introduction of new stirring up hatred offences there has to be a very 
serious threat to public order or security. This is a functional approach to scope 
specification. Yet the threat posed by incitement to hatred on grounds of disability, 
gender or transgender identity (so they argue) is not on a par with the threat associated 
with race or religion. Our society has experienced religious wars and race riots, after 
all, but nothing comparable in terms of these other characteristics. Then again, the 
justification required for new stirring up hatred offences need not be exactly the same 
as the justification required for existing stirring up hatred offences. Indeed, in the case 
of sexual orientation nobody seriously suggested that the UK was on the brink of a 
kind of sexual orientation war, hetero versus homo. What matters is not public 
disorder in the literal sense of race riots. That certain groups can be left feeling 
insecure as a result of incitement to hatred may be enough. And the feelings of fear 
and insecurity produced by different forms of incitement to hatred might be more 
similar than we think, not least in their silencing effects. Nevertheless, in other 
contexts the underlying or real function or purpose of incitement to hatred laws might 
be very different, and so the arguments around scope could play out very differently. 
In China, for instance, the underlying or real function or purpose of hate speech laws 
is to tackle speech which can undermine national harmony in the sense of causing 
friction between national minorities. Here the context is a substantially nondemocratic 
governmental regime covering a geographically huge state-nation made up of 
provinces some of which contain significant national minority groups that for some 
time have been agitating for greater political autonomy and even full independence. 
Given this underlying or real function or purpose, it may not be all that surprising that 
relevant hate speech laws cover only nationality or nationality minority status.106 
 Notwithstanding these observations about the importance of context, I will now 
attempt to draw some tentative conclusions of a general kind about which particular 
characteristics, identities or statuses ought to be protected under incitement to hatred 
laws informed by all five approaches. First, I believe that there is something 
approximating a core set of characteristics that tend to be supported to a significant 
extent by most, if not all, of the five main approaches (under their best 
interpretations). Not only do they crop up more often in bodies of law, legal literature 
and parliamentary debates, but it does seem that a strong case can be made, based on 
the five approaches, for lifting them into the position, if they are not there already, of 
protected characteristics. These are: race, ethnicity, nationality, regional nationality, 
citizenship status, religion, sexual orientation, gender (or gender identity), and 
disability. That being said, even for this core set of characteristics, there remain 
dilemmas about how their basic elements are to be defined and what there boundaries 
are. And, once again, resolving these dilemmas relies on some reasonable 
combination of the five approaches. Second, I also believe that there is a much longer 
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list of marginal or borderline characteristics that crop up more sporadically in the 
aforementioned arenas and arguably are supported only to some extent by only some 
of the five approaches. These are: age, age performance, education, employment 
status, gender performance,107 language status, marital status, medical status, parental 
status, personality traits or types, physical appearance, political beliefs, activities, or 
affiliations, pregnancy, profession, sexual preference, social status, and war record. 
Some of the characteristics find their way onto this list of borderline protectable 
characteristics because of practical considerations, such as lack of evidence to think 
that there is currently a problem of stirring up hatred related to them, whereas some 
are on the list in virtue of relevant formal and functional considerations. Most or all of 
them appear on the list in virtue of concerns over parity or even consistency. 
 Note, I call these “tentative” conclusions because for reasons of space I have only 
been able to present and sketch out with some illustrations a general framework or 
methodology for answering the “Who?” question. Although I have also put forward 
some substantive arguments about particular characteristics when illustrating and 
critically examining each of the five approaches to specification, I have not attempted 
to provide anything close to a comprehensive and definitive set of arguments for each 
one of the numerous characteristics considered under each of the five approaches. 
This would obviously require a much longer treatment. My two-part article has been 
designed merely to give a wide-angle overview of the landscape. Therefore, my 
conclusions should be read as working hypotheses based on limited research.  
 Now I also made it clear in Part 1 that my observations about the proper scope of 
hate speech laws are intended to relate specifically to incitement to hatred laws and 
that it is possible that some different conclusions would follow if the focus is shifted 
to other types of hate speech law. I stand by that claim. But, at the same time, I do not 
suppose that what I have said here is entirely idiosyncratic to this particular cluster of 
hate speech laws. It seems likely that some of the substantive arguments as well as the 
five approaches will be echoed in a discussion one could have about the proper scope 
of other types of hate speech law. In order to motivate this conjecture about partial 
overlap (but not identity) of plausible answers to the “Who?” question across different 
types of hate speech law, I shall take this opportunity to make some condensed 
remarks about one other variety of hate speech law. Consider laws that disallow, 
either directly or indirectly, the use of targeted insults, slurs, derogatory epithets or 
other abusive comments against individuals who are picked out by protected 
characteristics, especially in face-to-face encounters but also online.108 Here again I 
believe that issues of consistency and parity are likely to be important. Consider the 
fact that ss 31 and 32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998109 set out discrete racially 
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108 See, e.g., Brown, “Hate Speech”, supra note 2 at 23-26. 
109 (UK), c 37 [Crime and Disorder Act 1998], as amended by the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001 (UK), c 24 [Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001]. 
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or religiously aggravated public order and harassment offences. One such public order 
offence is racially or religiously aggravated intentional harassment, alarm or distress: 
namely, the offence of with intent, and aggravated by racial or religious hostility, 
using threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or displaying writing, 
signs or other visible representation that are threatening, abusive or insulting, and 
thereby causing harassment, alarm or distress.110 One recent high-profile case was R v 
Stacey.111 By contrast, there are no discrete aggravated public order or harassment 
offences covering the same conduct when it is aggravated by hostility toward victims 
based on their sexual orientation, disability, or transgender identity. Instead, such 
cases would be covered by generic hate crime or sentence enhancement provisions, 
that is, ss 145 and 146 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003,112 which give magistrates and 
judges the power to determine the seriousness of the offending, with hostility toward 
people based on race, religion, sexual orientation, disability, or transgender identity as 
an aggravated factor. Why does this difference matter? It matters because the 
sentencing structure is different depending on the offence, and this in turn means 
different treatment for similar conduct and different levels of protection for similar 
groups. So, for example, the discrete racially or religiously aggravated offence of 
intentional harassment, alarm or distress set out in s 31(1)(b) of the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998113 can be prosecuted either as a summary offence or as an 
indictable offence in crown court. In the latter instance, a person found guilty of an 
offence on indictment can be liable to imprisonment for up to two years.114 However, 
the equivalent basic offence of intentional harassment, alarm or distress set out in s 
4A of the Public Order Act 1986115 is only a summary offence handled in magistrates 
courts. A person found guilty of an offence on summary conviction can only be liable 
to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months.116 Therefore, even though a 
magistrate has the power under sentence enhancement provisions, that is, ss 145 and 
146 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, to take into account hostility toward victims 
based on disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity as an aggravating factor 
in judging the seriousness of a basic offence of intentional harassment, alarm or 
distress, a magistrate must operate within the aforementioned sentencing framework, 
                                            
110 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, supra note 109, s 31(1)(b). 
111 (2012), No. A20120033, Swansea Crown Ct, 30 March (involving messages sent by the 
defendant on the Twitter Internet messaging service in response to, and as part of a heated 
discussion about, a life-threatening heart attack suffered by a black footballer during a live 
broadcast match). 
112 (UK), c 44 [Criminal Justice Act 2003], as amended by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (UK), c 10, s 65 [Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of 
Offenders Act 2012]. 
113 Supra note 109. 
114 Supra note 109, ss 31(1)(b), 31(4), as amended by the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act 2001, supra note 109. 
115 Supra note 39. 
116 Supra note 39, s 4A(4).  
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meaning that he or she cannot exceed the maximum sentence of six months 
imprisonment for the basic offence.117 
 A full inquiry as to the proper scope of insult-focused hate speech laws must also 
inevitably turn to questions of underlying or real function or purpose. One obvious 
place to start is with harm. In the case of hate speech that takes the form of directly 
targeting insults, slurs, derogatory epithets or other abusive comments at individuals 
who are picked out by protected characteristics, especially in face-to-face encounters 
but also online, the harm can take the form of immediate or short-term emotional 
distress but also medium- to long-term psychological and physiological ill-health.118 
Once again, the logic of such functional arguments may point in the direction of 
shaping the scope of hate speech laws around particular sub-groups. Mari Matsuda 
has argued in relation to the US, for example, that laws criminalising or allowing civil 
redress for insults should be limited to protecting historically oppressed, victimised, 
persecuted or systematically discriminated against or disadvantaged groups, such as 
racial minorities.119 This speaks to the idea that the emotional and psychological toll 
of racist insults are of a special or sui generis quality, magnitude, and likelihood 
because of the history of slavery and other forms of racial oppression.120 Kent 
Greenawalt, however, argues that, depending on the country context, group-identity-
based insults or epithets may be especially hurtful or distressing not just for groups 
defined by race but also for groups defined by religion, gender, and sexual 
orientation.121 Mirroring existing scholarly arguments concerning the special nature 
and severity of emotional distress caused by racist insults due in large part to the 
history of black oppression, it is argued that insults directed at people based on their 
sexual orientation have a special power to cause psychological hurt or emotional 
distress due in large part to the history of homophobic discrimination and violence.122 
                                            
117 Supra note 112, as amended by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders 
Act 2012, supra note 112. 
118 See, e.g., Brown, “Hate Speech”, supra note 2 at 51-56. 
119 See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 7 at 2357. 
120 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, “Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, 
Epithets, and Name-Calling” (1982) 17:1 Harv CR-CLL Rev 133 at 179-181 [Delgado]; 
Kretzmer¸ supra note 4 at 458; Charles R Lawrence III, “If He Hollers Let Him Go: 
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus” (1990) 3 Duke LJ 431 at 458-459; Akhil Reed Amar, 
“The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul” (1992) 106:1 Harv L Rev 
124 at 125-26; Joshua Cohen, “Freedom of Expression” (1993) 22:3 Phil & Pub Aff 207 at 
255-56; Stephen J Heyman, “Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content Neutrality 
Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence” (2002) 10:3 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 647 at 690-
91, 713-14; Stephen J Heyman, Free Speech and Human Dignity (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2008) at 273, n 26.  
121 Greenawalt, “Speech”, supra note 44 at 147-148, 156, n 26; “Fighting Words”, supra note 
44 at 55. 
122 See, e.g., Toni M Massaro, “Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech 
Dilemma” (1991) 32:2 Wm & Mary L Rev 211 at 223; Major, supra note 11 at 227; Cohen, 
“More Censorship”, supra note 8 at 74; Leets, supra note 51 at 350, 356. 
 33 
Perhaps similar arguments could be made about the particular emotional distress and 
psychological damage caused by identity-based insults when they are directly targeted 
at individuals on grounds of their possessing disabilities or particular gender identities 
once again reflecting the history of discrimination and violence against members of 
such groups. Then again, it may seem wrong to make determinations of scope solely 
on the basis of purely functional arguments. Alon Harel, for example, argues that 
basing decision about the proper scope of insult-focused hate speech laws exclusively 
on the likelihood of hate speech against a given group of people causing social 
tensions or public disturbances would be “inherently demeaning”.123 According to 
Harel, when it comes to laws disallowing identity-based insults or epithets such as 
“nigger” or “kike”, to treat anti-black insults differently to anti-Semitic insults 
“simply because the racial hatred directed at Jews is less likely to lead to racial 
friction”124 would be to violate the abstract principle of treating citizens as equals.  
 In addition to this, there are bound to be balancing-based considerations in 
deciding the scope of insult-focused hate speech laws. One consideration might be 
that insults pertaining to disability and gender identity, for example, are so 
commonplace and embedded in our ordinary language that to disallow such speech 
would be to disallow a high volume of speech, thus requiring unprecedented levels of 
censorship and curtailment of free speech.125 However, to this argument it can be 
countered that at one time insults pertaining to race and religion were also a 
ubiquitous feature of ordinary language but that was not a legitimate basis for failing 
to combat them. Moreover, the mere fact that a law tends to render illegal a high 
volume of everyday or commonplace conduct is not always considered a decisive 
reason for repealing that law or for not enacting it in the first place, such as in the case 
of driving in excess of speed limits.126 
 Furthermore, some of what can be said about the proper scope of insult-focused 
hate speech laws might appear to reflect formal specification but is in fact functional 
specification. Richard Delgado, for example puts a slightly different spin on the moral 
significance of immutability, transforming it into a functional argument. According to 
Delgado, “[t]he psychological harms caused by racial stigmatization are often much 
more severe than those created by other stereotyping actions” precisely because 
“membership in a racial minority can be considered neither self-induced, like 
alcoholism or prostitution, nor alterable”.127 Racist hate speech (according to 
Delgado) can cause double misery: misery in being subjected to hate speech in virtue 
of one’s race; and misery in the knowledge that one is trapped, that there is nothing 
one can do to change the attribute in virtue of which one is being so subjected. If this 
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is true, then surely similar arguments could be made about many other characteristics, 
social identities or statuses.  
 Finally, I wish to end the article with two general remarks about the wider 
implications of my examination of the “Who?” question. I have used a combination of 
consistency, practical, formal, functional and democratic specification to generate 
both a relatively short list of core protected characteristics and a much longer list of 
borderline protectable characteristics. However, I must now address a potential 
objection to incitement to hatred laws tout court, namely, that to create any list of 
protected characteristics, and especially a long list of borderline characteristics, 
creates a slippery slope to a body of legislation that would be, in no uncertain terms, 
either an unmitigated disaster for, or a gross violation of, the right to freedom of 
expression. I believe the foregoing research provides one possible line of response to 
the slippery slope objection. The objection relies on the fact that once one 
characteristic is granted protection through hate speech laws, there are no relevant 
considerations on which to deny similar protection to other characteristics and 
associated groups of people. The research demonstrates that there are in fact at least 
five main families of considerations which could each potentially provide stopping 
points. 
 Second, I believe that the foregoing research may well have a wider significance 
beyond research on hate speech law. Political theorists who work on and with liberal 
theories of equality of opportunity as well as political theorists who work on and with 
theories of recognition, the politics of difference, multiculturalism, and intercultural 
dialogue, may benefit from the research by gaining a better understanding of what it is 
about groups or classes of persons that makes them eligible for not merely protections 
against certain forms of mistreatment (e.g., hate speech) but also exemptions from 
general laws, special accommodations when it comes to access to public goods and 
the provision of public services, and respect in matters of intercultural dialogue. The 
point is that although I have focused on the scope of hate speech laws, it may be that 
the five approaches I have outlined may be applicable to questions about the proper 
scope of protections in anti-discrimination and employment law, exemptions in road 
safety law, accommodation practices in built environment and urban planning policy, 
and rights to respectful communication in intercultural dialogue regulation, to name 
but a few examples. 
